The White House released details of its newly announced nuclear deal with Iran:
Key Excerpts of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
Preamble and General Provisions
The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any
This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions
as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.
A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor
the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this
The IAEA will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures
as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the
Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council.
The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this
JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its
consideration of this issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran.
Enrichment, Enrichment R&D, Stockpiles
Iran’s long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and
uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research
and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual
evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for
exclusively peaceful purposes.
Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will
keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment
capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related
infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring.
(Note: Iran currently has about 19,000 IR-1 and advanced IR-2M centrifuges installed)
Based on its long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment
at up to 3.67%.
(Note: Prior to the Joint Plan of Action, Iran enriched uranium to near 20%)
Iran will refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from
keeping any nuclear material at Fordow for 15 years.
(Note: Iran currently has about 2,700 IR-1 centrifuges installed at Fordow of which
about 700 are enriching uranium)
Iran will convert the Fordow facility into a nuclear, physics and technology center.
1044 IR-I machines in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordow. Two of those six
cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through
appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four
cascades with all associated infrastructure will remind idle.
During the 15 year period, Iran will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of up to
3.67% enriched UF6 or the equivalent in other chemical forms.
(Note: Iran currently maintains a stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched UF6)
All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored
under IAEA continuous monitoring.
More after the jump (click to continue):
Arak, Heavy Water, Reprocessing
Iran will design and rebuild a modernized heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on
an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enrichment up to 3.67%, in the form of an
international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support
peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and instructional
purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade
Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in
relying on light water for its future power and research with enhanced international
cooperation including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.
There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran
for 15 years.
Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear
Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement in accordance with Article 17 b) of the Additional Protocol.
Iran will fully implement the “Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding
Issues” agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues
of concern relating to its nuclear program.
Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the above voluntary measures
for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out
by the JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term presence in Iran;
IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore
concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and
bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including
on-line enrichment measure and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure
speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.
Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the
development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy
Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as
detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.
The UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA will terminate all the
provisions of the previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue
simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related
measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions.
The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended,
implementing all the nuclear related economic and financial sanctions, including related
designations, simultaneously with IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-
related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V.
The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance
with the JCPOA, of the sanctions specified in Annex II, to take effect simultaneously
with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed upon related measures by Iran as
specified in Appendix V.
(Note: U.S. statutory sanctions focused on Iran’s support for terrorism, human rights
abuses, and missile activities will remain in effect and continue to be enforced.)
Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion
that all the nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the
United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate or
modify to effectuate the termination of sanctions specified in Annex II.
Finalization Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among
the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution
endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN
Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the
JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA
come into effect.
Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying
implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1 to
15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States takes the actions described in Sections
16 and 17 of Annex V.
Transition Day is day 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director
General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader
Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is
UN Security Council resolution termination day is the date on which the UN Security
Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be
10 years from Adoption Day.
Dispute Resolution Mechanism
If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments
under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution;
similarly, if any of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments
under the JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 can do the same. The Joint Commission would
have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus.
After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to ministers
of foreign affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers
would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by
If the issue has still not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant,
and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-
performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease
performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and / or notify the UN
Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.